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 “SEG ACADEMIES,” TAXES, AND JUDGE GINSBURG 
Stephen B. Cohen, Georgetown Law School, sbclawprof@aol.com, 
202-352-8244, from The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg,  edited by 
Prof. Scott Dodson (2015) 
  
On the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia then-
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored an opinion with profound 
implications not only for the law of taxation but also for the role of 
courts in ending racial discrimination in education. The case, Wright v. 
Regan,1 involved the dramatic intersection of the income tax law and 
equal protection obligations of federal authorities under the 
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The precise 
technical legal issue before her was procedural—whether parents of 
black schoolchildren had standing to challenge the grant of federal 
tax-exempt status to racially segregated private schools—but it was 
hardly arcane or narrow. 2  In affirming that standing existed and 
reversing the contrary decision of the District Court below, Judge 
Ginsburg opined that the tax benefits of exempt status constituted 
significant financial assistance and that the provision of such 
                                      
1 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1983). 
2  On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s Supreme Court opinions concerning taxation have 
generally involved arcane and narrow procedural issues to the exclusion of the substantive 
problems generally occupying both academic and practicing tax lawyers. Her thirteen opinions, 
listed alphabetically, include: Ballard v. C.I.R., 544 U.S. 40 (2005); Barclays Bank PLC v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 
197 (2005); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004); Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999); 
Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Levin v. Commerce 
Ene., Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010); Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998); NFIB v. 
Sibelius, 567 U.S. 1 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring & dissenting); N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. Cnty. of 
Kent, 510 U.S. 355 (1994); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995); United 
States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 
(2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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assistance to racially segregated private schools—so-called “seg 
academies”—violated equal protection obligations imposed by the 
Constitution. 
Judge Ginsburg’s decision was unfortunately reversed on 
appeal by a divided Supreme Court, which ruled that the plaintiffs did 
not have standing because they lacked a sufficiently concrete interest 
in the outcome of the litigation. She nevertheless provided a 
persuasive and coherent defense of the right of victims of racial 
discrimination in education to seek redress in the courts, and strong 
dissents from Justices Brennan and Stevens (joined by Justice 
Blackmun) supported her position.  She thus created a benchmark 
that future Supreme Courts may use to revise a Supreme Court 
majority decision that appears, at least to this observer, as 
fundamentally wrong and fundamentally flawed. Her opinion in Wright 
also offers ways of understanding the later development of 
educational equal protection doctrine, including Ginsburg’s seminal 
decision in the Virginia Military Institute case.  
This essay recounts the historical, political, and legal context in 
which Judge Ginsburg’s ruling in the Wright case arose. This context 
explains the importance of her decision to the battle against 
segregated education and highlights as well the repeated efforts of 
powerful political forces, including the Reagan administration and 
congressional conservatives, to cripple efforts to prohibit racially 
discriminatory private schools from receiving federal subsidies 
through the tax system. This essay also aims to highlight Wright’s 
place in the modern doctrine of educational discrimination. 
I. “Seg Academies” and Tax-Exempt Status 
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A. The Importance of Tax-Exempt Status 
 For over a century, Congress has provided tax-exempt status 
to private schools that operate on a "not for profit" basis. The 
corporation income tax of 1894 specifically excluded from its 
coverage a broad array of nonprofit organizations, including 
educational institutions.3 In 1917, the individual income tax (enacted 
in 1913) was amended to give an additional advantage to a narrower 
class of nonprofit entities—primarily schools, churches, hospitals, and 
organizations for relief of the poor—by permitting their donors to 
deduct charitable contributions. 4  In later years, nonprofit 
organizations were also permitted to abstain from paying social 
security and unemployment taxes.5  
The conflict over tax exemptions for segregated private schools 
first emerged after the 1954 Supreme Court holding in Brown v. 
Board of Education that public school segregation is 
unconstitutional.6 Segregation academies, private schools formed to 
avoid the mandate of Brown, sought and received federal tax-exempt 
status. 7  Civil rights groups sued to prevent these schools from 
receiving federal tax benefits.8 
                                      
3 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. The exemption was reenacted in the 
Corporation Income Tax of 1909, Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112, and in the 
Revenue Act of 1913, Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G), 38 Stat. 172. The current version is 
I.R.C. § 501(c). 
4 This tax allowance originated with a floor amendment to the Revenue Act of 1917. 55 Cong. 
Rec. 6728 (1917) (remarks of Sen. Hollis). The current version is I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3). 
5 I.R.C. §§ 3121(k), 3306(c)(8). 
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7 See generally D. Nevin & R. Bills, The Schools that Fear Built (1976); Terjen, Close-up on 
Segregation Academies, NEW SOUTH, Fall 1972, at 50. 
8 See Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 378 (1979). 
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Throughout the controversy, segregated private schools fought 
hard to retain exempt status.9 Yet most of these schools lacked net 
income, because receipts are generally more than offset by expenses. 
While the exemption does confer immunity from social security and 
unemployment taxes, this benefit was not usually cited as 
important. 10 According to the IRS, the primary reason for seeking 
exempt status was so that gifts to a school can be deducted as 
charitable donations.11  
The deduction of claimed contributions, however, is proper only 
if the payments are truly charitable donations and are not made in 
payment for educational services. If the payment is required, explicitly 
or informally, as a condition of a student's enrollment, then its formal 
designation as a "contribution" is not controlling; the payment is 
treated as tuition and nondeductible. 12  In general, courts have 
regarded whether such a payment is "voluntary" and without 
"expectation of commensurate benefit" as a matter of subjective 
intent and have stated that the determination of intent depends on the 
facts and circumstances of each particular case.13  
In 1979, however, the IRS announced a new objective test for 
charitable contributions to private schools in Revenue Ruling 79-99,14 
                                      
9 See generally Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax-Exemption of Private Schools: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter “Implementation Hearings”].  
10 See Nevin & Bills, supra note 7, at 15. Payroll taxes, however, were the focus of the litigation in 
Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1980), and Goldsboro 
Christian Schools, Inc, v. United States, No. 80-1473, at 2 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981). 
11 See Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 254 (statement of Jerome Kurtz). 
12 See B. BITTKER & L. LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 35.1.3 (2013). 
13 See id. 
14 1979-1 C.B. 108. 
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based on a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals.15 To the 
extent that the value of educational services to the donor's children 
exceeded designated tuition, a contribution was to be treated as non-
deductible. The new revenue ruling was protested by the entire 
private school community, which complained about the automatic 
disqualification of parents as donors to the extent that the real costs 
of educating their children exceeded tuition.16  
In December 1980 the Treasury told Congress that secular and 
sectarian private schools had agreed on a compromise that would 
supersede Revenue Ruling 79-99.17 The compromise accepted the 
subjective standard, but then set forth objective criteria from which 
subjective intent could be more easily inferred. Certain enumerated 
factors, alone or in combination, would imply that the contribution was 
made "in expectation of obtaining educational benefits" for the donor 
and therefore was not deductible: for example, the denial of 
admission to children of taxpayers who do not contribute; or the 
absence of a significant tuition in a school that places unusual 
pressure on parents to contribute.18  
At the time, this controversy over disguised tuition was not 
connected with the ongoing conflict over exemptions for private 
schools that discriminate. Yet the segregated private schools (unlike 
most other private institutions) strongly opposed the compromise 
reached between the IRS and most other private institutions. Their 
                                      
15 Oppewal v. Comm’r, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972). Oppewal was followed in Haak v. United 
States, 451 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1978). 
16 A description of the controversy can be found in 126 Cong. Rec. S16, at 228-36 (Dec. 11, 
1980). 
17 See id. at 231-34. 
18 Id. at 233-34. 
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opposition suggests that they benefited significantly, not only from 
bona fide donations, but also from charitable deductions taken for 
disguised tuition.19 Thus, the ability of parents to deduct disguised 
tuition may have been the critical advantage of exempt status for 
segregated schools, perhaps as or even more important than the 
deduction for bona fide charitable donations.  
B. The Green Principle: Denying Tax-Exempt Status to 
Racially Segregated Private Schools  
Not until 1970 under the pressure of litigation instituted by civil 
rights groups, did the IRS accept the principle that racially segregated 
schools may not lawfully receive tax-exempt status.20 In 1969 the 
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights filed Green v. Kennedy, an action 
on behalf of black schoolchildren in Mississippi, challenging the 
constitutionality under the equal protection clause of the grant of tax 
exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools.21 Because of 
the claim that a federal statute was being applied in violation of the 
Constitution, a three-judge federal court was convened.22 On January 
12, 1970, the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the IRS to 
                                      
19 Id. at 228-31. 
20 Until 1965, exempt status was routinely granted to private schools without regard to practices 
of racial discrimination. In the mid-1960s, however, the IRS decided to re-examine this policy in 
the light of Brown v. Board of Education and later Supreme Court decisions invalidating state aid 
to segregated private schools. From October 15, 1965, to August 2, 1967, a freeze was 
maintained on applications for exempt status "filed by private schools apparently found to be 
operated on a segregated basis." Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1970). In 
1967, after an internal review, the IRS concluded that it lacked authority to withhold exemptions 
except where the school already received other substantial state assistance, such as tuition 
grants or the use of public facilities. IRS News Release, Aug. 2, 1967, reprinted in 1967 Stand. 
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6734. 
21 The named defendant, David Kennedy, was Secretary of the Treasury. After he was replaced 
by John Connally, the case was retitled Green v. Connally and is commonly referred to by that 
name. 
22 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1976). 
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withhold exemptions from segregated schools in Mississippi.23 In July 
1970, the IRS announced a policy of denying exempt status to all 
segregated private schools nationwide.24 One year later the Green 
court issued a final opinion interpreting the Internal Revenue Code as 
not granting exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools.25  
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Harold Leventhal gave 
three reasons for this conclusion. First, under the common law, an 
organization whose activities are illegal or contrary to public policy is 
not entitled to privileges and immunities ordinarily afforded to 
charities.26 If Fagin's school for pickpockets could not qualify as a 
charitable trust, then neither should a segregated private school.27 
Thus, "if we were to follow the common law approach," the Code 
would be interpreted to deny exempt status in such cases.28 Second, 
the Internal Revenue Code "must be construed and applied in 
consonance with the Federal public policy against support for racial 
segregation of schools, public or private."29 The numerous "sources 
and evidences of that Federal public policy" included the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, Brown and its progeny, and the 1964 
Civil Rights Act.30 Third, any other construction "would raise serious 
constitutional questions" and "it would be difficult indeed to establish 
                                      
23 Green, 309 F. Supp. 1127. 
24 IRS News Releases, July 10 and July 19, 1970, reprinted in 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 
6790, 6814 (1970). 
25 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). 
26 Id. at 1157-59. 
27 Id. at 1160. 
28 Id. at 1161. 
29 Id. at 1163. 
30 Id. 
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that such [tax] support can be provided consistently with the 
Constitution."31  
In addition, a permanent injunction was issued against the 
government, even though the IRS had acquiesced in the preliminary 
order,32 because of the need to prevent future administrations from 
changing course:  
 
The July 1970 [IRS] Press Release does not indicate 
whether the new construction is considered mandatory or 
merely within the sound discretion available to the IRS in 
construction of the Code. If defendants' construction were 
discretionary, it could be changed in the future. We think 
plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of relief on an 
enduring, permanent basis, not on a basis that could be 
withdrawn with a shift in the tides of administration, or 
changing perceptions of sound discretion.33 
 
The injunction applied only to Mississippi because, under 
equitable principles, such relief had to be limited to the plaintiffs 
before the court. However, Judge Leventhal emphasized that, 
notwithstanding the restricted geographical scope of his order, the 
legal principle enunciated in construction of the Internal Revenue 
Code applied nationally:  
To obviate any possible confusion the court is not to be 
misunderstood as laying down a special rule for schools 
                                      
31 Id. at 1164-65. 
32 Id. at 1170-71. 
33 Id. 
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located in Mississippi. The underlying principle is broader, 
and is applicable to schools outside Mississippi with the 
same or similar badge of doubt.34 
On appeal, Green was affirmed (albeit summarily) by the 
Supreme Court. 35  Green was also cited in four decisions of U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, upholding IRS authority to deny exemptions to 
racially discriminatory schools. 36  In addition, Congress appears to 
have ratified the Green decision in 1976 by explicitly amending the 
Code to deny tax-exempt status to social clubs that discriminate on 
the basis of race.37 By prohibiting exemptions to segregated social 
clubs, Congress signaled its understanding that exemptions for 
segregated schools already were disallowed. 38  Both House and 
Senate reports specifically cited Green as establishing that 
"discrimination on account of race is inconsistent with an educational 
institution's tax-exempt status."39  
The Green principle—construing the IRC to prohibit the grant of 
exempt status to whites only private schools—has been subject to 
only one significant and, as it turned out, short-lived challenge since 
1970.  Late in the afternoon of Friday, January 8, 1982, the Reagan 
administration made two startling announcements.40 First, the Internal 
                                      
34 Id. at 1174. 
35 404 U.S. 997 (1971), sub nom. Coit v. Green. 
36 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980); Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc, 
v. United States, No. 80-1473 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981); Prince Edward Sch. Found. v. United 
States, No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1980); Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
37 Pub. L. No. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976). 
38 Congress added Section 501(i) to reverse a judicial decision that upheld tax exemptions for 
these groups in McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). 
39 S. Rep. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-8 & n.5 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1353, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 8 & n.5 (1976). 
40  U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, "Treasury Establishes New Tax-Exempt 
Policy," Jan. 8, 1982, reprinted in Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax 
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Revenue Service, reversing an eleven-year-old policy, said it would 
henceforth grant tax exemptions to segregated private schools, 
because, in the view of the Reagan administration, the IRS had no 
legal authority to deny them. Second, the government asked the 
Supreme Court to vacate, as "moot," Bob Jones University v. United 
States41 and Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States,42 two 
cases in which racially discriminatory private schools were 
challenging prior denials of tax-exempt status.43  
After critical public reaction, 44  however, the Reagan 
administration swiftly backed off and changed course. It said that it 
favored and would submit to Congress legislation to authorize the 
IRS to deny exemptions to private schools that discriminate. 45 
Pending congressional action, moreover, the IRS would continue to 
deny them in all such cases, save for Bob Jones and Goldsboro, to 
which exempt status would be restored.46 Five weeks later, the D.C. 
Circuit enjoined the IRS from granting exemptions to any segregated 
school, including Bob Jones and Goldsboro.47 The government then 
                                                                                                              
Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 607-08 (1982) [hereinafter “Policy Change Hearings”]. 
41 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980). 
42 No. 80-1473 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981). 
43 Memorandum for the United States, reprinted in Policy Change Hearings, supra note 40, at 
612-14. 
44 See Wolfman, Law, Cut on a Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1982, at A27; Kraft, A Con Job, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 21, 1982, at A19; Lewis, Shucks, It's Only the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1982, at A23; 
Pirouetting on Civil Rights, TIME, Jan. 25, 1982, at 24. 
45 White House Press Release, "Statement by the President," Jan. 12, 1982, reprinted in Policy 
Change Hearings, supra note 40, at 620. 
46 Weisman, Reagan Acts to Bar Tax Break to Schools in Racial Bias Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
1982, at A1. 
47 Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982). 
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withdrew the "suggestion of mootness" in the two Supreme Court 
cases,48 and oral argument occurred later that fall.  
The Supreme Court issued its near unanimous decision a few 
months later. In Bob Jones University v. United States, Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for an 8-1 majority held, as did the earlier three-judge 
panel in Green, that the Internal Revenue Code must be construed to 
prohibit the denial of exempt status to racially segregated private 
schools.49 The lone dissenter was Justice William Rhenquist. 
When all these actions are put together—the Supreme Court’s 
affirmance of the Green decision, congressional endorsement of 
Green through the legislative denial of tax-exempt status to 
segregated social clubs, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bob 
Jones—the Green principle appeared firmly entrenched.  
C. Lax Enforcement 
Despite the ringing affirmation of the Green principle—that 
exempt status must be withheld from racially discriminatory private 
schools—enforcement of that principle in practice was lax. In the 
thirteen-year period, following the first order in Green and preceding 
then Judge Ginsburg’s opinion in Wright v. Regan, tax-exempt status 
was withheld from only 111 schools that enrolled probably no more 
than 50,000 students.50  
The Southern Regional Council (an organization of Southern 
business, labor, religious, and professional leaders interested in race 
                                      
48 Taylor, Schools Tax Issue Put to High Court in Shift by Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1982, at 
A1. 
49 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
50 Taylor, U.S. Drops Rule on Tax Penalty for Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1982, at A1. The 
average segregated school was estimated to enroll 200 students. See generally supra note 7 
(citing sources). Even if that estimate is doubled, the 111 schools denied exemptions would be 
expected to enroll no more than 50,000 students. 
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relations) estimated that in 1970 about 400,000 whites were attending 
segregated schools and that by 1972 this figure had grown to 
535,000. 51  One organization of private schools, affiliated with 
segregationist white citizen councils, reported its 1971 membership 
as including 396 academies with 176,000 students.52 In 1978, the 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission counted 3,500 schools that were 
created or substantially expanded at the time of local school 
desegregation.53 (All 3,500 may not have discriminated, but it was 
reasonable to assume that a substantial proportion did, given the 
propinquity in time of the schools' creation or expansion to 
desegregation efforts.) Perhaps the most pointed evidence of 
nonenforcement was that a number of private schools adjudged by 
federal courts to be discriminatory, and therefore ineligible for direct 
aid to education, continued to enjoy federal income-tax exemptions.54 
While there was no consensus as to the total number of segregated 
private schools, even the lowest estimate indicated that only a tiny 
fraction was denied exemption.  
The gap between principle and practice resulted from 
implementing procedures, under which a school obtained a tax-
exemption merely by declaring that it did not discriminate. Once the 
required declaration was made, the school was presumed 
nondiscriminatory, and the presumption was rarely challenged.  
                                      
51 Terjen, supra note 7, at 50. 
52 Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1448 (1973). 
53 Implementation Hearings, supra note 9 at 479 (statement of E. Richard Larson).  
54  Id. at 5 (statement of Jerome Kurtz); Staff of Subcommittee on Oversight of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means, Report on IRS's Proposed Revenue Procedure Regarding the 
Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 40 & nn.3-4 (Committee Print 
1979) [hereinafter “Staff Report”]. 
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The first enforcement guidelines,55 contained in the July 1970 
IRS press release, accepted the Green principle but made 
declaration of nondiscrimination easy. Tax exemptions would be 
"available to private schools announcing racially nondiscriminatory 
admissions policies," and "in most instances evidence of a 
nondiscriminatory policy can be supplied by reference to published 
statements of policy." 56 The manner of publication was left to the 
school's discretion.  
The permanent injunction issued in Green in 1971 specified 
that Mississippi schools were to include the policy statement in all 
brochures, catalogues, and printed advertising and to "bring it to the 
attention of . . . minority groups."57 In response, the IRS formally 
announced nationwide publicity standards in 1972. Revenue 
Procedure 72-54 listed acceptable methods, in the alternative, as: 1) 
publication in a "newspaper of general circulation that serves all racial 
segments of the locality"; 2) "broadcast media" that reach "all 
segments of the community the school serves"; 3) "school brochures 
and catalogues" if "distributed . . . to all segments of the community 
that the school serves"; or 4) advising "leaders of racial minorities . . . 
so that they in turn will make this policy known to other members of 
their race."58  
After the U.S. Civil Rights Commission challenged the 
adequacy of these standards, 59  the IRS adopted somewhat more 
                                      
55  The temporary Green order, issued the previous January, offered no guidance on 
implementation. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970). 
56 IRS News Releases, supra note 24, ¶¶ 6790, 6814. 
57 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C. 1971). 
58 1972-2 C.B. 834. 
59 Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 4 (statement of Jerome Kurtz). 
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stringent guidelines in 1975. Revenue Procedure 75-50 sets out three 
basic requirements, all of which must be met. First, the 
nondiscrimination policy must be stated in the school's charter or by-
laws, in all brochures and catalogues, and all written advertising. 
Second, the policy has to be publicized either in a "newspaper" or 
through the "broadcast media." Third, the publicity has to occur 
"during the period of . . . solicitation for students . . . during the 
school's registration period."60 The 1975 guidelines remain in effect 
today. 
These four approaches—the 1970 IRS press release, the 1971 
Green injunction, the 1972 Revenue Procedure, and the 1975 
Revenue Procedure—assumed that a mere declaration of policy was 
adequate to enforce the Green principle. Yet according to the U.S. 
Civil Rights Commission, the Justice Department under Presidents 
Ford and Carter, and a congressional study, even the heavier burden 
of publication imposed in 1975 was easily met by schools that in fact 
practiced racial discrimination.61 Most simply declared that they did 
not discriminate and thus obtained exemptions.62 Only the handful 
                                      
60 1975-2 C.B. 587-88. The second requirement of publicity through the mass media is, however, 
relaxed for three kinds of schools. A church-related school drawing at least 75% of its students 
from the sponsoring religious denomination may announce its anti- discrimination policy in a 
church newspaper. A school drawing a substantial percentage of students from a large 
geographical area may demonstrate reasonable efforts to inform students of its policy. A school 
with a meaningful number of minority students is entirely exempt. Id. at 588-89. 
61 The positions of the Civil Rights Commission, the Ford Justice Department, and the Carter 
Justice Department are reported in Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 221-35, 237-51, 
1175-87. A staff report expressed general agreement with their conclusions, Staff Report, supra 
note 54, at 21. 
62 According to Rep. Sam Gibbons:  
Not surprisingly, this [has] proved inadequate. It was a bit like asking the average 
American taxpayer to simply mail in a check for his taxes, along with an 
affirmation that the amount enclosed was correct, without requiring any specific 
figures or documentation. 
Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 1. 
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that openly acknowledged their discriminatory practices lost exempt 
status.  
In 1976, the IRS was sued for stricter enforcement of the Green 
principle: in Mississippi by the reopening of Green and in the other 49 
states by the filing of Wright v. Regan, a class action on behalf of 
parents of black schoolchildren nationwide. 63  Both suits were 
consolidated, but the proceedings were suspended in 1978, when the 
IRS published its own proposal for stricter enforcement. 64  The 
proposal was derived from criteria developed by federal district courts 
for identifying segregated private schools ineligible for state textbook 
aid.65  
The new IRS enforcement proposal focused not on self-serving 
declarations but on two objective factors: the propinquity in time of a 
private school's formation or expansion to public school 
desegregation, and the private school's proportion of minority 
enrollment. Any private school formed or substantially expanded at 
the time of local public school desegregation would be presumed 
discriminatory unless its minority enrollment was at least 20 percent 
of the proportion of minorities in the local community's school age 
population.66 The presumption could be rebutted only by engaging in 
four of five specified practices designed to attract minority students 
and faculty.67  
                                      
63 The case was originally docketed as Wright v. Simon, No. 76-1426 (D.D.C. July 30, 1976). 
64 Proposed Rev. Proc., 43 Fed. Reg. 37296 (1978). 
65 Brumfield v. Dodd, 425 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. La. 1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 382 F. Supp. 921 
(D. Miss. 1974). 
66 Proposed Rev. Proc., supra note 64, § 3.03. 
67 Id. § 4.02. 
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Public reaction to the 1978 proposal was overwhelmingly 
negative. The IRS received over 150,000 letters, virtually all in 
opposition, and the public was invited to comment during three days 
of hearings at the IRS national office.68 As a result of the criticism, the 
proposal was made substantially less rigid and was republished in 
1979.69 Under the revised proposal, the presumption of discrimination 
would arise only if minority enrollment was "insignificant" (in addition 
to the school being founded or expanded at the time of local public 
school desegregation), and rebuttal of an unfavorable presumption 
was made considerably easier.70 These changes, however, were not 
sufficient to overcome the negative public reaction.71  
After hearings in the House and Senate on the revised 
proposal, 72  Congress froze enforcement in the mold of the 1975 
Revenue Procedure by attaching two riders to the Treasury 
Appropriations Bill for 1980. One, the Dornan amendment, 
specifically denied funds for enforcement of either the original 1978 
proposal or the 1979 revision.73 The other, the Ashbrook amendment, 
prohibited the use of appropriated funds to enforce any Treasury or 
IRS guidelines not in effect before August 22, 1978 (the date on 
which the IRS published its 1978 enforcement proposal).74 Both the 
                                      
68 Staff Report, supra note 54, at 40. 
69 Proposed Rev. Proc., supra note 64.  
70 Id.  
71 See Implementation Hearings, supra note 9; Staff Report, supra note 54, at 1-8. 
72 Implementation Hearings, supra note 9; Staff Report, supra note 54, at 1-8; Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Committee on 
Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
73 Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
74, § 615, 93 Stat. 559, 577 (1979). 
74 Id. § 103, 93 Stat. at 5-62. 
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Dornan and Ashbrook amendments continued in effect for several 
subsequent fiscal years.75  
These congressional efforts undermined the IRS attempt to 
strengthen its enforcement rules. As a result of the Ashbrook and 
Dornan amendments, the ineffective enforcement protocol of the 
1975 Revenue Procedure remained the only vehicle for implementing 
the principle of Green.76  
II. Litigation Resumes: The Strengthened Green Order and 
Wright v. Regan 
A. The District Court 
In 1979, following passage of the Ashbrook and Dornan 
amendments, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights reopened the 
suspended proceedings in Green and Wright, seeking a court order 
of more vigorous enforcement of the Green principle.  In November, 
District Court Judge Hart dismissed the Wright component on 
jurisdictional grounds,77 primarily because the plaintiffs were held to 
lack standing under the 1975 Supreme Court opinion in Simon v. 
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization (EKWRO).78 
                                      
75 The restrictions remained in force during the 1981 and 1982 fiscal years because Treasury 
funds were provided through continuing resolutions, which automatically carried through any 
restrictions on appropriations enacted in the previous fiscal year. Continuing Appropriations for 
Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-369, 94 Stat. 1351 (1980); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-536, 94 Stat. 3166 (1980); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-51, 95 Stat. 958 (1981); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97-85, 95 Stat. 1098 (1981); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Pub. L. 
No. 97-92, 95 Stat. 1183 (1981).  
76 The two riders did not alter either the Green construction of the Internal Revenue Code or the 
existing requirement that exempt private schools announce a nondiscrimination policy. The 
sponsors stated that their purpose was only to prevent implementation of the new enforcement 
rules. Thus, neither bill prohibited the spending of appropriated funds to enforce the 1975 
Revenue Procedure. Policy Change Hearings, supra note 40, at 691-92, 701. 
77 The case was then docketed as Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979). 
78 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
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In EKWRO, indigent plaintiffs challenged a Revenue Ruling 
permitting a hospital, to receive tax-exempt status regardless of 
whether it provided free or below cost service to the poor. The 
plaintiffs lacked standing, the Supreme Court declared, because it “is 
purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the 
complaint fairly can be traced to (the Ruling) or instead result from 
decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax 
implications.” 79  Similarly, in the Wright litigation, Judge Hart 
concluded, it was purely speculative whether racial discrimination by 
segregated private schools could be traced to IRS enforcement 
practices or resulted from decisions made by the schools without 
regard to taxes.  
Judge Hart, however, rejected an identical argument with 
respect to the Green component, because standing had already been 
found by the original three-judge panel in 1970.80 After trial on the 
merits, in May 1980, Judge Hart granted the kind of substantive relief 
requested by the Green plaintiffs by ordering stricter enforcement. He 
enjoined the IRS from granting exempt status to Mississippi schools 
that were "established or expanded at the time of local school 
desegregation, unless the schools clearly and convincingly 
demonstrate that they do not discriminate."81  
In July 1980, following Judge Hart’s order in the Mississippi 
litigation, Congress acted to prevent the IRS from denying 
exemptions to private schools under his strengthened Green 
injunction or any other future judicial rules. It expanded the Ashbrook 
                                      
79 Id. at 42-43. 
80 480 F. Supp. at 793 n.1. 
81 Green v. Miller, No. 1355-69 (D.D.C. May 5, 1980), amended, June 2, 1980. 
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rider, which already banned spending to enforce any rule made by 
the Executive after August 22, 1978, to include in addition "any . . . 
court order."82 Meanwhile, during this same period, the dismissal of 
Wright was on appeal to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.  
B. The Appeal: Judge Ginsburg’s Opinion 
In June 1981, the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge 
Ginsburg, reversed Judge Hart and ruled that the Wright plaintiffs did 
have standing.83 Her opinion began by reviewing in detail the history 
of both the Green and Wright litigation. 84   She emphasized “the 
anomalous result” of the district court decision.85 To obey both court 
decree and congressional stop order, the Service must apply one set 
of guidelines to schools in Mississippi and another, less stringent set 
of procedures to schools outside Mississippi, even schools bearing 
‘the same or similar badge of doubt.’ ”86 
Acknowledging that the 1975 Supreme Court opinion in 
EKWRO stands for the proposition that "litigation concerning tax 
liability is a matter between taxpayer and IRS, with the door barely 
ajar for third party challenges," 87  Judge Ginsburg cited other 
Supreme Court precedents pointing in the opposite direction, 
affirming that parents of black schoolchildren do have standing to 
challenge government assistance to private schools practicing race 
discrimination. In particular, Judge Ginsburg noted that in the  
                                      
82 Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-51, supra note 64. 
83 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
84 Id. at 823-825. 
85 Id. at 826. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 828.  
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companion Green litigation, Norwood v. Harrison,88 and Gilmore v. 
City of Montgomery,89 the Supreme Court upheld the standing of the 
plaintiffs to challenge government conduct as “inconsistent with an 
overriding, constitutionally rooted national policy against racial 
discrimination in United States educational facilities.”90 
In Norwood v. Harrison, parents of black schoolchildren 
challenged aid to segregated private schools under a Mississippi 
program begun in 1940, which furnished free textbooks for students 
at all public and private elementary and secondary schools in the 
state.91 In a unanimous decision, the Justices found for the parents 
and ordered the Federal District Court in Mississippi to establish 
procedures for identifying private schools that were racially 
discriminatory and therefore ineligible for free textbooks.92  
One year later, in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, parents of 
black students sought an injunction against "the use of city owned 
and operated recreational facilities by any private school group . . . 
which is racially segregated."93 Citing Norwood, the Supreme Court 
again unanimously affirmed an order against the exclusive use of 
certain facilities, because that constituted "tangible state assistance 
outside generalized services . . . . "94  
                                      
88 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
89 417 U.S. 556 (1974). 
90 656 F.2d at 829. 
91 413 U.S. at 457. 
92 Id. at 471. 
93 417 U.S. at 556.  
94 Id. at 568.  The proceedings were remanded to the District Court for findings as to whether the 
nonexclusive "use of zoos, museums, parks, and other recreational facilities by private school 
groups in common with others . . . involves the government so directly as to violate the equal 
protection clause."  Id. at 570.  Four Justices would have declared unconstitutional, without 
remand, the nonexclusive use of facilities, such as athletic fields, that relieve [the schools] of the 
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Given these precedents, Judge Ginsburg concluded: 
Green, Norwood, and Gilmore presented plaintiffs whose 
standing seems to us indistinguishable on any principled 
ground from the standing of the plaintiffs in this action. If 
the plaintiffs before us are not entitled to question the IRS 
practices at issue here, it is difficult to comprehend why 
the Green, Norwood, and Gilmore plaintiffs were entitled 
to challenge the tax exemptions, textbook loans, and 
specially reserved park facilities at issue in those cases.95 
 
Thus, Judge Ginsburg’s opinion in Wright provided a 
persuasive defense of the right of parents of back schoolchildren to 
challenge the provision of government assistance, include tax-exempt 
status, to racially segregated private schools.  She affirmed the 
Green principle that “seg academies” may not receive tax-exempt 
status.  She offered an important vehicle, litigation by private 
individuals, for curing the woeful underenforcement of Green when 
more vigorous implementation was blocked by congressional 
enactment of the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments. 
C. The Supreme Court Reverses 
In 1984, three years later, a 5-3 Supreme Court majority 
reversed Judge Ginsburg’s decision on grounds similar to those cited 
by Judge Hart.96  The opinion of the Court by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor stated: 
                                                                                                              
expense of maintaining their own facilities" or are used "for events that are part of the school 
curriculum."  Id. at 576-82. 
95 656 F.2d at 828. 
96 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
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The diminished ability of respondents' children to receive 
a desegregated education would be fairly traceable to 
unlawful IRS grants of tax exemptions only if there were 
enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving 
tax exemptions in respondents' communities for 
withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable 
difference in public school integration. Respondents have 
made no such allegation. It is, first, uncertain how many 
racially discriminatory private schools are in fact receiving 
tax exemptions. Moreover, it is entirely speculative . . . 
whether withdrawal of a tax-exemption from any particular 
school would lead the school to change its policies.97 
 
Thus, Justice O’Connor concluded: 
The links in the chain of causation between the 
challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury 
are far too weak for the chain as a whole to sustain 
respondents' standing. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org. . . . the Court held that standing to 
challenge a Government grant of a tax-exemption to 
hospitals could not be founded on the asserted 
connection between the grant of tax-exempt status and 
the hospitals' policy concerning the provision of medical 
services to indigents.98 
                                      
97 Id. at 758. 
98 Id. at 759. 
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Justice William Brennan, endorsing Judge Ginsburg’s 
reasoning, issued a stinging dissent: 
Once again, the Court “uses ‘standing to slam the 
courthouse door against plaintiffs who are entitled to full 
consideration of their claims on the merits.’ ”99 
[T]he Court displays a startling insensitivity to the 
historical role played by the federal courts in eradicating 
race discrimination from our Nation's schools—a role that 
has played a prominent part in this Court's decisions from 
Brown v. Board of Education . . . .100 
Moreover, Justice Brennan continued, the allegations in the 
complaint were more than sufficient to satisfy standing requirements: 
[T]he respondents have alleged a direct causal 
relationship between the Government action they 
challenge and the injury they suffer: their inability to 
receive an education in a racially integrated school is 
directly and adversely affected by the tax-exempt status 
granted by the IRS to racially discriminatory schools in 
their respective school districts. Common sense alone 
would recognize that the elimination of tax-exempt status 
for racially discriminatory private schools would serve to 
lessen the impact that those institutions have in defeating 
efforts to desegregate the public schools.101 
Justice Stevens, whose separate dissent was joined by Justice 
Blackmun, also emphasized the majority’s “untenable assumption 
                                      
99 Id. at 766. 
100 Id. at 767. 
101 Id. at 774. 
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that the granting of preferential tax treatment to segregated schools 
does not make those schools more attractive to white students and 
hence does not inhibit the process of desegregation.”102 
III.  The Legacy of Wright 
A. Segregated Private Schools Since the Supreme Court 
Decision  
During the 30-years since the 1984 Supreme Courts’ decision 
in Wright, there have been numerous studies of the de facto 
resegregation of America’s public school systems but surprisingly no 
systematic examination of the contribution of private segregated 
education to his phenomenon. What evidence exists is anecdotal.  
For example, in 2002, the Birmingham News reported on the 
Wilcox Academy in rural Alabama as “100 percent white, a typical link 
in the chain of private Black Belt academies erected in the late 1960s 
and 1970s to circumvent federal integration orders.”103 However, the 
newspaper also noted, “The chain is weakening by the year. Beset 
with dwindling enrollments, internal conflicts and an inability to pay 
teachers' salaries, so-called ‘seg academies’ close down regularly in 
this rural stretch of central Alabama.”104  
There are reports, however, that all-white private academies in 
the South continue to receive federal tax-exempt status, even in 
Mississippi, where Judge Hart’s strengthened enforcement order may 
have had little or no effect. In 2012, an article in the Atlantic magazine 
described one such school in Indianola, Mississippi, that continues to 
                                      
102 Id. at 795. 
103 Crowder, Private White Academies Struggle in Changing World, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 27, 
2002, available at http://www.al.com/specialreport/birminghamnews/?blackbelt16.html. 
104 Id. 
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benefit from federal tax-exempt status.105 The Atlantic also claimed 
that at least 35 such schools continue to operate in the Mississippi 
Delta.106  
B. Echoes of Wright v. Regan in the Virginia Military 
Institute Case. 
There were echoes of Wright v. Regan in the much later 1996 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Virginia107 (VMI) for which 
Justice Ginsburg also wrote the opinion of the Court. In Wright, Judge 
Ginsburg expressed serious doubt that the equal protection clause of 
the Constitution permits the federal government to grant tax-exempt 
status to racially segregated private schools. In VMI, Justice Ginsburg 
held that the equal protection clause does not permit the state to 
finance a military college, the Virginia Military Institute, open only to 
male applicants.  
It was of course direct state funding rather than tax-exempt 
status that raised the equal protection issue in ViMI. Nevertheless, 
during oral argument counsel for the state argued that if the 
Constitution requires a military college financed and controlled by the 
state of Virginia to admit women, then it also requires Wellesley 
College to admit men or lose its federal tax-exempt status. 108 
Similarly, in dissenting from the Court's decision in VMI, Justice 
Scalia wrote: "[I]t is certainly not beyond the Court that rendered 
today's decision to hold that a [tax deductible] donation to a 
                                      
105 Carr, In Southern Towns, “Segregation Academies” are Still Going Strong, ATLANTIC, Dec. 13, 
2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/12/in-southern-towns-
segregation-academies-are-still-going-strong/266207/. 
106 Id. 
107 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
108 id., Transcript of Oral Argument at 45. 
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single-sex college should be deemed contrary to public policy and 
therefore not deductible if the college discriminates on the basis of 
sex."109 
Notwithstanding the conclusion that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit exempt status for racially segregated private 
schools, and notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in VMI, 
can exempt status be constitutionally provided to single-sex private 
educational institutions? The constitutional status of whites-only 
private schools is vastly different from that of single-sex educational 
institutions. Although in Bob Jones, the Supreme Court cited the 
"unmistakably clear" agreement among "all three branches of the 
Federal Government" that racial discrimination must be eliminated,110 
there is no evidence of a similar hostility to single-sex educational 
institutions. Thus, an amicus brief in the VMI case contrasted racially 
segregated education with single-sex education to counter the 
suggestion that if a military college financed by, and subject to the 
control of, the state of Virginia is required to admit female applicants, 
then Wellesley College must admit men or lose its federal tax-exempt 
status: 
The three branches of the federal government have not, 
acting independently or in concert, articulated a position 
against, much less launched a crusade to dismantle, 
private single-sex colleges . . . . In short, there is no 
"fundamental public policy" or "declared position of the 
whole Government" which the maintenance or 
                                      
109 518 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
110 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983). 
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establishment of private single-gender undergraduate 
college programs contravenes . . . . Moreover . . . the 
evidence is clear and well-established that single-sex 
education for women is particularly effective in preparing 
them for leadership and success, generally, and in 
male-dominated fields, more particularly.111 
As Justice Ginsburg noted in VMI, the Supreme Court has 
"reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on 
race or national origin . . . ."112 In addition, there is a vast difference 
between the kind of support afforded the Virginia Military Institute—
the college was largely financed and controlled by the state of 
Virginia—and the less extensive and intrusive support afforded by 
tax-exempt status. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in VMI noted the 
special circumstances of the case, addressing "specifically and only 
an educational opportunity recognized . . . as 'unique,' . . . an 
opportunity available only at Virginia's premier military institute, the 
Commonwealth's sole single-sex public university or college."113  
In the absence of special circumstances, however, the Equal 
Protection Clause Fourteenth Amendment should permit an all-men's 
(as well as an all-women's) college to benefit from tax-exempt status, 
even though more intrusive government financing and control of the 
kind in the VMI case would raise equal protection issues and despite 
the fact that racially segregated private schools should ordinarily not 
be permitted to receive exempt status given the especially high 
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518 U.S. 515, 1995 WL 702837, at *23, *25. 
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constitutional value placed on ending racial discrimination in 
education. 
Judge Ginsburg’s consideration of Wright—where the 
underlying issue involved the strict scrutiny of racial classifications 
under  the equal protection clause—may have influenced Justice 
Ginsburg’s articulation of  the intermediate  scrutiny  of gender  
classifications in cases like VMI. Indeed,  together  VMI  and  Wright  
present  an   integrated  and  balanced  approach  to  equal 
protection  challenges that  considers   differences  between  race  
and  gender  discrimination and  between  different kinds of 
government assistance. Thus, tax-exempt status for racially 
segregated private schools would be constitutionally suspect while 
tax-exempt status for an all male institution presumably would not. 
Of course, depending on the context and the myriad different 
ways that single-sex education might be implemented, it is 
conceivable that in special circumstances, tax-exempt status for 
single-sex private education might offend the Equal Protection Clause. 
Justice Ginsburg’s tax expert husband, Prof. Martin G. Ginsburg, 
suggested one such circumstance over thirty years ago in 1977.114  
The IRS had ruled that a charitable deduction was available for 
contributions to a males-only college scholarship for graduates of a 
coeducational high school. 115  Prof. Ginsburg conceded that 
contributions to a scholarship for students at a single-sex institution 
could be deductible.  He forcefully argued, however, that the IRS 
                                      
114 Husband of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg for 56 years until his death in 2010, Prof. Martin 
David Ginsburg was an internationally renowned tax expert and probably the greatest authority 
ever on the law of corporate taxation.  
115 TAM 7744007, 1977 WL 50659 
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ruling on a males-only scholarship at a coeducational institution was 
inconsistent with applicable federal law, Supreme Court precedents, 
and possibly even the Constitution.116  
 
[T]he Supreme Court has declared invidiously 
discriminatory gender-based classifications that denigrate 
women or deny them equal opportunity. Such 
classification . . . is inconsistent with the equal protection 
requirement of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The 
decade's precedent solidly establishes an elevated review 
standard for gender-based allocation of benefits or 
opportunities. A "legitimate" objective will not save a sex 
classification; a "rational" means/end relationship will not 
suffice. In the Court's words: "To withstand [constitutional] 
scrutiny . . . classifications by gender must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to those objectives."117  
Strongest condemnation has been expressed by the 
Court for the gender criterion used to preserve for males 
special advantage in "the marketplace and the world of 
ideas." Distinguishing "between [boy and girl] on 
educational grounds," the Court has emphasized, is "self-
serving" and "coincides with the role typing society has 
long imposed."118  
                                      
116 Martin Ginsburg, Sex Discrimination and the IRS: Public Policy and the Charitable Deduction, 
10 TAX NOTES 27 (Jan. 14, 1980). 
117 Id. 
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APPENDIX  
THE DEDUCTION FOR CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION: FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE OR AN INCOME-DEFINING PROVISION? 
Judge Ginsburg’s opinion in Wright v. Regan assumes that a 
deduction for charitable contributions to racially segregated private schools 
constitutes financial assistance, analogous to a direct grant of funds from 
the federal government.  A number of tax theorists have argued, however, 
that the charitable deduction should not be regarded as if it were a direct 
grant because it is consistent with measuring income and is thus 
comparable to the deduction for ordinary and necessary business 
expenses that is allowed to arrive at a "true" income figure.  
The income measurement view starts with the generally accepted 
standard, the Haig-Simons definition:  
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of 
(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) 
the change in value of the store of property rights between the      
beginning and end of the period in question.119 
Income, in other words, equals the value of what is consumed plus 
what is saved. Since donations are neither consumed nor saved by the 
donor, they are not income to the donor and must be deducted from the 
donor's tax base. The contributions are actually used up only by the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the charity.120  
However, the donor's consumption can be defined to include the 
satisfaction derived from making a charitable donation, and the value of 
                                      
119 H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation, 50 (1938). 
120 See Andrews, Personal Deductions In An Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 346 (1972); 
Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants? 28 Tax L. Rev. 37, 59 
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such satisfaction might equal at least part of the value of the gift. "When 
they turn their attention to charitable contributions, tax economists almost 
uniformly argue that these are consumption expenditures from which the 
donor gets what he pays for, viz., personal satisfaction undiminished by the 
fact that the recipient also benefits from his generosity."121 It is therefore 
arguable whether a full deduction for charitable contributions is consistent 
with measuring the donor's income.  
Even conceding this point, it is not enough to focus solely on the 
donor; the income measurement issue requires considering the tax 
treatment of both donor and donee together. If the donor does not benefit 
from the gift and is therefore entitled to a deduction, then logically there 
should be income to the ultimate beneficiary who consumes it. Yet the 
beneficiary never reports the item because Code Section 102(a) permits 
donees to exclude all gifts in computing taxable income. The beneficiary's 
gift exclusion combines with the donor's charitable deduction to result in the 
income represented by the donation never being taxed. The nontaxation of 
both donor and donee is consistent with income measurement only when 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the gift are too poor to owe taxes. This 
condition might be satisfied if charitable deductions today were limited to 
the category of "relief of the poor"; but it is doubtful that the condition is 
more than occasionally met by the ultimate beneficiaries in this case, the 
students attending private schools and their parents.122  
                                      
121 B. Bittker in C. Galvin and B. Bittker, The Income Tax: How Progressive Should It Be? 53-54 
(1969). 
122 Cf. Bittker & Raedhert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income 
Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299, 334 (1976):  
[T]he students who attend exempt schools . . . probably come from higher income 
classes than most of the beneficiaries of other charitable organizations . . . it weakens 
one argument in favor of exempting many other nonprofit organizations – that the burden 
of a tax would fall largely on persons at the bottom of the income ladder. 
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Another argument views the charitable deduction as income-defining 
because it is needed to equalize the tax treatment of a donor who 
contributes cash or property with a donor who makes a gift of his or her 
own services.123 Consider a doctor and a lawyer, both of whom wish to 
contribute to a hospital. The doctor works five hours a week on the wards 
without pay. Because his contribution takes the form of imputed income 
from services, the donation is disregarded in determining his taxable 
income. The lawyer contributes the fees from five hours of legal work. His 
position is like the doctor's except that he donates income in nonimputed 
cash form, which means that it must be reported as income. In order to 
treat the lawyer the same as the doctor, an offsetting deduction for the cash 
donation might be allowed. Nevertheless, as a general rule we do not 
correct for differences in treatment caused by nontaxation of imputed 
income. If a lawyer pays someone else to write a will or a baker buys 
another's cakes, no deduction is allowed for the expenditure even though 
each might have consumed his own services and thereby realized no 
taxable income.  
The income measurement view also appears at odds with the general 
rule (to which the charitable deduction is a clear exception) that ordinary 
gifts may not be deducted.124 Why do gifts to the Red Cross and Yale 
                                                                                                              
 
See also Andrews, supra note 98, at 356-57:  
Many contributions are to private schools, whose student bodies are probably still 
disproportionately representative of the affluent part of the population. 
123 See Andrews,  supra note 98, at 352-4; and Bittker, supra note 98, at 59-60. 9-60. 
124 Congress appears to have consistently regarded the charitable deduction as a subsidy rather 
than an income measurement provision. For example, in 1938 when foreign charities were 
excluded from the category of eligible donees, the House Ways and Means Committee explained:  
The [deduction] is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated 
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise 
have to be met by appropriations from public funds . . . . The United States 
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University reduce the donor's Haig-Simons income, but not gifts to the 
Committee to Reelect the President or a favorite nephew? Gifts to ordinary 
donees are, in the same sense, neither saved nor consumed by the donor. 
And the general rule is not considered to cause overtaxation even if the 
donor is in a higher tax bracket than the donee or if a disparity exists vis-a-
vis donors who make gifts of imputed income.  
The critical problem for proponents of the income measurement view 
is to justify special treatment for charitable gifts when ordinary gifts are not 
deductible. They appear to rely primarily on the idea that gifts to charity, 
unlike gifts to relatives or friends that finance private consumption, satisfy a 
moral obligation or provide desirable public goods:  
[C]haritable contributions represent a [moral] claim of 
such a high priority that . . . a case can be made for excluding 
them in determining the amount of income at the voluntary 
disposal of the taxpayer in question . . . . Side by side with 
taxpayers who can satisfy their charitable impulse by making a 
contribution of their time . . . are others who feel the same 
charitable impulse, but, must discharge their moral obligation by 
contributing cash or property.125 
 
Almost all charitable organizations other than those that 
distribute alms to the poor produce something in the nature of 
common or social goods or services. The benefit produced by a 
                                                                                                              
derives no such benefit from gifts to foreign institutions, and the proposed 
limitation is consistent with the above theory.  
 
H. R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 (part 2) C. B. 728, 742. If 
Congress had believed in the income measurement theory, then logically foreign donees would 
not be treated differently. 
125 Bittker, supra note 98, at 59-60. 
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contribution to a private school, for example . . . . [T]he product 
is essentially a common good . . . . [T]he ultimate benefits from 
schooling flow beyond the immediate recipients. 
General education makes better citizens . . . . 126 
In the end, whether or not we consider the charitable deduction 
generally to be an income measurement provision depends on a whole 
range of value judgments, all of which are debatable. This uncertainty 
reflects the fact that the generally accepted standard for income 
measurement -- the Haig-Simons rule -- lacks precision and does not 
always provide clear or easy answers. The inexactness of the standard has 
been used to criticize the view of the charitable deduction as equivalent to 
a direct grant in other contexts, such as devising a comprehensive tax base 
or compiling a tax expenditure budget.127 Nevertheless, unless segregated 
education is deemed to serve a moral goal or provide a desirable public 
good, then a critical premise of the income measurement view (that may be 
appropriate in other contexts) is not valid in this specific case.  
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